BUILD: ssl_sock: bind_conf uninitialized in ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk()
Even if this cannot happen, ensure <bind_conf> is initialized in this function to please some compilers. Takes the opportunity of this patch to replace an ABORT_NOW() by a BUG_ON() because if the variable values they test are not initialized, this is really because there is a bug. Must be backported to 2.6.
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@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
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int err, depth;
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int err, depth;
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X509 *client_crt;
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X509 *client_crt;
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
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struct bind_conf *bind_conf;
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struct bind_conf *bind_conf = NULL;
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struct quic_conn *qc = NULL;
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struct quic_conn *qc = NULL;
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ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
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ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
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@ -1734,10 +1734,7 @@ int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
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}
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}
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#endif
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#endif
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if (!ctx || !bind_conf) {
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BUG_ON(!ctx || !bind_conf);
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/* Must never happen */
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ABORT_NOW();
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}
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ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
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ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
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